U.S. DISTRI	CT COURT
DISTRICT	OF IDAHO
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CLERK, U.S. DISTRICT COURT 1 United States Bankruptcy By Deputy District of Idaho Boise, Idaho

Docket No. BK-96-02095-12

TERRY HIPWELL,

Debtor.

Boise, Idaho April 18, 1997 9:30 a.m.

PORTION OF HEARING ON 1) CONFIRMATION OF AMENDED PLAN (Continued) 2) MOTION TO DISMISS - TRAVELER'S (Continued)

TRANSCRIPT OF JUDGE'S RULING

CHAPTER 12

THE HONORABLE JIM D. PAPPAS, PRESIDING UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY JUDGE

COURT RECORDER:

TRANSCRIPTION BY:

BARBARA KECK U.S. Bankruptcy Court NORTHWEST TRANSCRIPTS, INC. P.O. Box 890

Nampa, Idaho 83653-0890

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Proceedings recorded by electronic sound recording, transcript produced by transcription service.

APPEARANCES:

FOR THE DEBTORS:

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FOR THE CREDITORS:

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For Amalgamated Sugar (TASCO): RICHARD BOARDMAN, Esquire P.O. Box 199 Boise, Idaho 83701 (208) 344-4566

For Landview: JOHN D. HARRINGTON, Esquire P.O. Box 247 Nampa, Idaho 83653-0247 (208) 466-9272

PROCEEDINGS IN PROGRESS

THE COURT: Thank you very much. I appreciate the hard work of the lawyers involved. I know this is a difficult case and I am sensitive to the critical nature of the timing that we have involved here. And so rather than take it under advisement, and study it, and give you a written decision, I'm going to go ahead and announce my decision today, because I'm fairly convinced that -- what that decision ought to be, so these will be my oral findings of fact and conclusions of law and I reserve the right to enter formal findings and conclusions at a later date if I deem that appropriate.

I must, somewhat reluctantly, deny confirmation of the plan. Let me approach this somewhat backwards and I think you'll -- as a means of explaining why I say I'm reluctant in denying confirmation of the plan.

I want to talk about the feasibility issue first as opposed to talking about the rights of the individual creditors. This farming operation is typical of many that we see in Chapter 12, and as long as a reasonable effort has been done by the Chapter 12 debtor to project yields and expenses based upon the debtor's historical performance that are not significantly out of line with overall performance, the inclination of the Court is, as a matter of personal preference and I think as a matter of Congressional policy should be to give the debtor the benefit of the doubt. I

think the reason for that, it should be obvious here. As I indicated I think the standard of proof under the code is not that the debtor guarantee a feasible operation. If we were all demanding guarantees from our farmers we just wouldn't have very many of them. It's fraught with risk. I wouldn't trade places with a farmer for anything in the world, frankly, because of all the risk involved everyday in that business. So I admire our farmers in that regard for their fortitude in that.

Secondly, I think that because it's inherent and because Chapter 12 is a rehabilitative chapter, a remedial chapter. And Congress is telling us that if there's a way to save family farms we ought to do it. And as long as the rights of the parties can be reasonably protected through the Chapter 12 plan, we give the benefit of the doubt I think to the farmer and allow the farmer a chance to meet the farmer's own reasonable goals. And we presume that mother nature will cooperate. We presume that the market will cooperate. And we presume that the Chapter 12 debtor will work very hard, because, frankly, most all of them do. We don't hold those things against the debtor.

Under those circumstances, from what I've heard from the evidence and testimony, while I would agree that Mr.

Hipwell's crop production -- or crop yield estimates may be on the optimistic side, I don't think they're so much on the

optimistic side as to be -- as has been characterized by the creditors, unrealistic. I think -- I think they may be challenging to obtain, but I don't think they are unattainable. And I don't think any -- there is evidence to the contrary there. I think it would take a very good year for Mr. Hipwell to reach his projections here, but then I also think that Mr. Hipwell would work -- knowing everything he knows and all the pressures, that he would work very very hard with the assistance of his experts to make sure that everything is done to see that he meets his projections.

The reason I'm approaching it this way is because I think, were the only the issue feasibility here, I would likely confirm the plan and give Mr. Hipwell a one year chance to meet his estimates. And, Mr. Hipwell, we would just let you succeed or fail based on your own merit there. Based on how good your own projections were. That's really the way I believe this system ought to operate.

And so that's what I would like to do, but I can't.

And the reason I can't is because I -- that presumes that the rights of the creditors will be properly protected by the terms of the Chapter 12 plan while the debtor attempts to work out of the problems.

And here are the concerns that I have here and, of course, the applicable law here with respect to secured claims is Section 1225(a) of the Bankruptcy Code. That's the

standard before confirmation. Standards for confirmation.

There's more than one of them of course.

With respect to TASCO, I think Mr. Boardman hits the nail right on the head when he says that until the claim of TASCO is disallowed that we have to presume that it is an allowable claim. And by that, that means we can't ignore TASCO's rights. That's not the same thing as saying that we have to begin making payments to TASCO, but what it does mean is I think you have to present a plan which, presuming that the status of TASCO will not change, could work. And in this case what we have is a plan which I think presumes that TASCO's claim will be disallowed. And I think that's the wrong approach and perspective when measured against the bankruptcy laws.

In addition I really feel that in the absence of any sort of payments in trust or any other kinds of protection for TASCO, that given the nature of their collateral, and the fact that it is used farm equipment and vehicles, and the depreciation that it will inevitably suffer as a result of normal wear and tear.

The cushion between the amount of TASCO's claim and the value of its collateral is inadequate to protect it for a period of two years.

I just think that if -- even if we take Mr. Foley's approach and say, well, just give us two years to get this

determined in the state court, I'm afraid at the end of two years, with the continued use of the equipment and the continuing interest that would be allowed under 1225(a) on TASCO's secured claim, that would expose TASCO to unreasonable risk of loss.

Now I want to be clear here what I'm not holding. I'm not holding that in order to confirm a plan you have to begin making payments to TASCO in the same way that you make payments to all other secured creditors that you do not dispute. All I'm saying is that if you dispute the claim and want time to pursue disallowance of the claim, you have to insure that measures are incorporated into the plan that will preserve the status quo and protect TASCO during that time period against any continuing loss. In effect, what I'm trying to do is preserve the situation today while the litigation goes on and barring that. I don't think that we can enhance TASCO's risk and still confirm the plan.

And in taking that approach I'm basically relying upon the debtor's numbers as to what the claim is and what the value of the security is.

Mr. Boardman, I don't know, by the way, if I've done you any great favor here. Because I don't think simply because I refuse to confirm this plan or even if I dismiss the case, I don't think that converts to cash for you folks.

MR. BOARDMAN: I realize that, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. With respect to Landview. Let me explain how I see Landview's secured status and the problems I see with the approach and to me they are the principle concerns that the Court has with confirmation here.

Assuming the balance owed to Landview is somewhere around a hundred and seventy-seven thousand dollars (\$177,000) and -- as recited by counsel and I'm not making that finding, I'm just using that as a starting point.

I find that under the security documents that I've reviewed that they do have a secured interest in the 1996 wheat -- or grain crop and any remaining 1995 beet crop to secure the full balance due under both '95 and '96 accounts. I do that because of the dragnet clause in the 1996 account agreement.

For whatever it's worth, Landview also has a security interest, a subordinate security interest in the debtor's equipment, not the titled vehicles, just the equipment, to secure the 1996 credit and that credit only, because that does not come within the dragnet clause.

I'm willing to accept the debtor's opinion that there is forty-one thousand dollars (\$41,000) in equity in that equipment, but I'm a little hesitant to do that, because as I understood it, Mr. Foley, that also included the titled vehicles. And I don't think Landview has a lien on the titled vehicles. They don't have any titles. So, whatever value

they have in the equipment that is also a secured claim, but let's face it, their principle security is the crop proceeds.

With respect to the real estate, the fact they have a second mortgage on part of the farm I think is valueless. They are effectively unsecured on the land, because of the existence of the first mortgage in excess of -- what is it, five hundred and seventeen or twenty thousand dollars? I didn't really hear a good value opinion concerning the value of the farm, but I didn't hear anyone suggest it was worth more than five hundred and twenty thousand dollars (\$520,000) and that's the critical issue here.

So under the Chapter 12 plan, because the debtor wants to use the one hundred and five thousand dollars (\$105,000) in crop proceeds, what the debtor must do is pay Landview at least a hundred and five thousand dollars (\$105,000), plus whatever value there is in the equipment over the term of the plan, plus interest. Plus show me that Landview has an adequate security position for that amount.

If the debtor intends to use the 1995 -- or excuse me, '96 crop proceeds to farm in 1997, some sort of security must be substituted for that money. And that's -- that's absolutely clear.

In fact we -- we have local decisional law that dates back to the late '80s I believe, right after Chapter 12 was adopted. I was still lawyering at the time, I think the

1 case is called Skyline Farms, that says "a debtor may not offer as adequate protection for use of last year's crop proceeds solely a lien on next year's crop proceeds". just not adequate. There's just too many risk inherent in that.

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I've never -- I don't adhere to that strictly, but where I -- where I would give the debtor a break there is not the spring, it might be in the fall. I mean if we were confirming a plan today and the debtor could come in and say, gosh, you know, 30 days from now I'll be harvesting and the crops look terrific and the price looks good and we could really say that but for, you know, and in one month that we would have a real good crop, I think maybe you could make a case that a '97 lien is a good and adequate substitute for the '96 money. But the problem is, this is April and there's so many things that can happen between April and September or October that I think, once again, the risk of loss is just too great.

In addition, of course, realistically I think the lien you can give Landview would have to, by necessity, be subordinate to the lien that other creditors would request in exchange for 1997 inputs.

You've already committed to pay for some seed, for example, out the proceeds of the crop. And it seems to me that to the extent there are fertilizer, chemical, other

inputs that go into the crop, those new creditors are entitled to prior positions. That's just the way business is done. Of course, that's my understanding of it anyway. And that goes right down, by the way, to the hired labor I think anymore, under Idaho's lien laws. They're to get theirs off the top before we go paying, what amounts to Landview terms loan now, we've converted from a one year loan, in effect, to a five year loan, so.

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Therefore, the Court finds that while the feasibility issue is very very close, I would likely resolve that in favor of the debtor and confirm the plan, were that the only issue. Unfortunately that isn't the only issue. I find that the debtor's proposed treatment under the amended plan of both secured creditors TASCO and Landview, fertilizer [sic] fails to comply with the confirmation standards of Chapter 12 of the Bankruptcy Code. And in so finding I'm compelled to deny confirmation of the plan.

Mr. Foley, I really need your candid and honest input here as to where we go? Ms. Neal's got a motion to dismiss. Mr. Schoen has a trustee's recommendation on file saying that if your debtor can wrestle the cash collateral away from Landview that the case has no history. If there's anyone more optimistic than farmers, it's farmer's lawyers. I really need your good advise on where you think this leaves your client?

MR. FOLEY: Judge, I'm not sure that I can -- I can respond quickly. I guess I'd like to -- I understand the issue.

THE COURT: Well, and I'm -- I'm interested in Mr. Hipwell having as much a chance as we can possibly give him, in spite of the creditor's protestations. On the other hand the point is, is it is decision time, simply because of the fact it's spring. And so let me propose this. All right?

Ms. Neal, I'm going to continue a hearing on your motion to dismiss. And on the trustee's recommendation, I'm going to reserve ruling on whether or not the case is dismissed, converted, whatever, for a very short period of time and let you think your position over. We'll put you on the next available hearing date and we'll listen to your thoughts at that time. Okay?

THE CLERK: Your Honor, May 1st, 9:30.

THE COURT: That does not stop the debtor, of course, from doing whatever the debtor voluntarily wants to do in the interim with respect to where the case goes. That's the best I can do.

Any questions or comments at this time?

Okay, I'll sign the minute entry and use that as my order denying confirmation so that no one else has to do one up, including my law clerk.

And we'll -- if we don't hear from you sooner, we'll

see you back here on the 1st of May. ATTORNEYS: Thank you. THE COURT: Thank you very much. PROCEEDINGS CONCLUDED AT 1:00 P.M. (Court Adjourned)

CERTIFICATION

I (WE) CERTIFY THAT THE FOREGOING IS A CORRECT TRANSCRIPT FROM THE ELECTRONIC SOUND RECORDING OF THE PROCEEDINGS IN THE ABOVE-ENTITLED MATTER.

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